Our goal is to elucidate the interaction of banks' screening e¤ort and strategic information production in loan-backed asset markets using a general equilibrium framework. Asset quality is unobserved by investors, but banks may purchase error-prone ratings. The premium paid on highly rated assets emerges as the main determinant of banks' screening e¤ort. The fact that rating strategies re ‡ect banks' private information about asset quality helps keep this premium high. Conventional regulatory policies interfere with this decision margin, thereby reducing signaling value of high ratings and exacerbating the credit misallocation problem. We propose a tax/subsidy scheme that induces e¢ciency.
Introduction
The economic expansion leading up to the 2007-2008 …nancial crisis witnessed an unprecedented growth of markets for securitized products. Several empirical papers 1 suggested that the rise of securitization weakened loan originators' incentives to screen their borrowers, thereby lending support Corresponding Author: oksana.m.leukhina@gmail.com to popular narrative, e.g. (Stiglitz, 2007) and (Blinder, 2007 ). Yet, our theoretical understanding of real implications of markets for loan-backed assets remains limited. In this paper, we examine macroeconomic implications of information asymmetry that plagues these market.
Our main premise is that banks, whose screening choices determine resource allocation in the economy, possess valuable information regarding their asset quality which is not available to investors, who provide the funds and bear the risk. Our speci…c goal is to elucidate the interaction of strategic information transmission by way of ratings and ratings' disclosures on the part of banks and their screening e¤ort at the time of loan origination.
To this end, we develop a general equilibrium rational expectations framework with heterogeneous banks lending to heterogeneous borrowers and representative investors. In order to raise funds, banks must sell their loans to investors. Consistent with the classic role of intermediaries, banks are able to make sure, at a cost, that they extend high quality loans. The information available to banks about their asset is not observable by investors, but an imperfect rating technology, which reveals the true asset type with a …xed probability, is available to banks at a cost. Pro…t maximizing banks choose their screening e¤ort, rating and ratings disclosure strategies. Employing the rating technology should be interpreted loosely as engaging in a costly process, which results, with some positive probability, in the enhancement of the perceived value of the asset. Investors observe the disclosed ratings and pay competitive prices in line with rational expectations regarding asset quality.
The following important insight immediately emerges from our model: It is the premium paid on assets with good ratings that disciplines the screening e¤ort. In turn, this premium is directly proportional to informativeness of a good rating, Pr GjGR Pr GjN R . This quantity describes the gain in investors' rational belief that the asset is of high quality, which results from observing a good rating. In the case of a perfectly accurate rating technology, rating informativeness is maximal as banks are aware of their asset quality, and their rating behavior re ‡ects this information. However, an imperfect rating technology lowers the informational content of a good rating, both directly, by providing a less accurate signal, and indirectly, by encouraging strategic rating of low quality assets. As a result, the premium paid on highly rated assets is too low to induce the e¢cient level of screening.
The role of strategic ratings is also critical in helping the model interpret the variation in default rates across asset classes documented in (Cornaggia et al. , 2017) and explaining a number of puzzling trends seen in pre-crisis data. The presence of a strategic use/disclosure of error-prone ratings is well grounded in the data. (Benmelech & Dlugosz, 2009a) employ tranche-level CLO data to show that there is a signi…cant mismatch between tranche ratings and the quality of underlying collateral. They also document that 70% of the dollar value of CLO tranches received a triple-A rating in 2000, while 23% did not have a published rating.
The fact that banks know their asset quality and produce ratings accordingly helps keep rating informativeness relatively high. Regulatory policies that dictate mandatory rating, certi…ed review, and mandatory disclosure of ratings interfere with this decision margin. Under mandatory rating, sellers of low quality assets are dictated to rate, which makes good ratings less informative and discourages screening e¤ort at the stage of loan origination. Certi…ed review denotes a policy that eliminates availability of free bad ratings, making it possible for investors to distinguish between unrated and poorly rated assets. In this richer context, we also consider the policy of mandatory ratings disclosure which requires that all ratings are disclosed. Under both policies, strategic rating intensi…es as poor ratings now serve as positive signals. This reduces the relevant premium and compounds resource misallocation. Thus, contrary to conventional wisdom, these policies are counterproductive, and the strategic rating decision is to blame.
We formally show that any policy that curtails strategic rating activity, whether it is through a direct mandate or through altering the model parameters that directly enter the rating decision, encourages screening activity and moves the economy closer to e¢ciency. This contrasts the current use of the issuer-pay model which typically requires pay for published ratings only -such a system does nothing to discourage strategic ratings.
Finally, our optimal policy analysis considers a policy maker that cannot directly enforce screening by banks, dictate the use of ratings, or observe the quality of extended loans, but has the ability to distort prices. We examine two policy schemes. The …rst is a tax on rating activity which raises the e¤ective cost of ratings and works through discouraging strategic ratings. The second is a tax/subsidy scheme which directly distorts prices of rated and unrated assets. Both policies improve economic outcomes. However, full e¢ciency is possible to achieve only in the case of the tax/subsidy scheme, as it directly rewards the screeners and punishes the non-screeners. Importantly, our welfare results stem from the presence of interplay between strategic ratings of assets and the ex-ante selection of projects underlying asset quality. Such feedback e¤ect has not been modeled in related literature on information transmission in asset markets. This literature typically focuses on understanding why ratings fail to accurately re ‡ect asset quality. Our paper is most closely related to (Skreta & Veldkamp, 2009) (Frenkel, 2015) , (Kashyap & Kovrijnykh, 2016) . We intentionally abstract from modeling behavior of rating agencies so as to isolate the e¤ects of banks' strategic ratings on their ex-ante choice of project selection. However, our welfare analysis highlights the important role of rating accuracy, suggesting that future analysis can bene…t from incorporating agencies' behavior into a framework like ours.
The paper is organized as follows. The model is described in Section 2. Section 3 contains equilibrium characterization and discussion of the role played by strategic ratings in generating ine¢ciency and explaining pre-crisis data patterns. Conventional regulatory policies are studied in Section 4. Optimal policy analysis is performed in Section 5, and conclusions appear in Section 6.
Model
We consider an economy with investors and heterogenous banks each facing a pool of informationally opaque heterogeneous projects/borrowers. 3 Borrowers are in need of funds, investors desire to save, and banks alone have the technology to screen and identify repaying borrowers.
Banks need to raise funds by selling loans to investors. But investors do not possess information about the underlying quality of traded assets. (Gorton, 2009 ) discusses the severity of this type of asymmetric information.
The model period can be subdivided into three stages occurring in the following order.
1. Screening of Projects. Banks choose whether or not to engage in costly screening of projects when originating loans or choose them at random. Upon origination, loan quality is revealed to the banks.
2. Rating of Assets. Banks choose whether or not to rate their assets.
3. Asset Trade. Banks and investors trade in competitive loan markets.
Note that we do not attempt to explain the rise of markets for loan-backed assets and defer to a separate body of work for that. 4 We simply assume their existence by postulating that banks are in need of investors' funds. This assumption is also what keeps trade from unravelling, see (Shavell, 1994) , and makes the problem of information asymmetry relevant. 5 Our equilibrium concept will require that, given asset prices, banks use optimal screening and ratings strategies, that asset prices re ‡ect investors' beliefs regarding asset quality, and those beliefs are consistent with equilibrium outcomes.
Banks
There is a continuum of measure 1 of pro…t-maximizing banks, heterogeneous in their screening cost k F [0; 1] ; which is unobserved to investors. F is continuous and represents the cumulative distribution function of banks' screening costs. Each bank faces its own pool of potential projects of unobserved types 2 fG; Bg; represented in proportions 0 and 1 0 ; respectively. Each project requires 1 unit of funds and repays W on the loan, with W := W G W B > 0:
Banks have the option of using the screening technology at the cost k; which guarantees …nancing of a good project. Otherwise, the borrower is chosen at random. Lending to a type borrower should be interpreted very generally, as standing in for extending a large basket of loans that generates W in total proceeds. 6
Once the borrower is …nanced, the asset type is revealed to the bank. This information regarding the quality of underlying loans is not available to investors. At a cost c, banks can employ a rating technology (i.e. an unbiased rating agency) that reveals the true asset type with probability r 2 (0:5; 1]. Availability of this technology is needed to incentivize banks to issue high 4 e.g. (Gorton & Pennacchi, 1995) and (Parlour & Plantin, 2008) . This literature largely agrees on liquidity needs as underlying loan sales. 5 In the absence of liquidity needs, the problem could be resolved if originating banks retained the most risky tranche of their loan basket, thereby sending a credible signal to asset buyers, e.g. (DeMarzo, 2005) . 6 This represents interest and principal repayment, or collections in case of default. quality assets. 7 Rating an asset stands in for engaging in a costly process that results, with some positive probability, in the enhancement of the perceived value of the asset. Such process may involve hiring consultants to navigate the rating process and shopping for a favorable rating. 8 The assumption that r > 0:5 simply captures the idea that banks with better assets are more likely to succeed in this process. We also assume that bad ratings are available for free to all banks, which rules out the signaling value of poor ratings and ensures that only good ratings are revealed.
The following parametric assumptions are needed: 9
Assumption 1 We assume that W > c and 0
Let P GR and P N R denote prices on assets with good ratings and no ratings (or hidden poor ratings). Taking these prices as given, banks choose their screening and rating strategies to maximize pro…ts.
Rating Strategy
Because asset prices are conditioned only on ratings, all banks holding an asset of a given type will make the same rating decision. Denote the probability of rating a type asset by f . Type B assets are rated with certainty (f B = 1) if the indi¤erence condition (1) holds with ">", implying that the expected price gain, P := P GR P N R ; obtained with probability of a rating error, 1 r, strictly exceeds the cost of using the technology. They are not rated (f B = 0) if the condition holds with "<", and the mixed strategy f B 2 (0; 1) is played otherwise:
We restrict attention to the range of parameter values, to be derived in Lemma 1, for which high quality assets are rated with certainty (f G = 1):
7 In the case of r = 0:5, there would be no premium paid on high ratings, and no bank would rate or screen their loans. 8 We have also worked out a model with multiple rating draws, but did not …nd additional insight su¢cient to justify the added complexity. 9 The …rst assumption implies that, under full information, a bank would choose to rate a good project. The second guarantees that all banks participate in lending (see online appendix A).
Screening Strategy
Taking asset prices and optimal rating strategies as given, each bank decides whether or not to pay k to screen out bad projects. R denotes the expected return to an asset of type :
Consider returns to a type G asset, which is rated with certainty. With probability r, the bank obtains a high rating and sells the asset for P GR . With probability 1 r, this bank obtains a poor rating, hides it, and sells the asset for P N R . The return is reduced by the rating cost and loan amount. A type B asset sells at a premium only in the case it is rated and a good signal is obtained in error, which happens with probability (1 r) f B : Otherwise, the bank sells the asset for P N R .
The return is reduced by the expected rating cost and loan amount.
Banks that choose to screen …nance high quality loans with certainty. The ex-ante expected return for these banks is given by R G k: Banks that draw projects at random …nance high quality loans with probability 0 : The ex-ante expected return for these banks is given by
It follows that, in order to maximize the ex-ante expected return to investment, a bank of type k should screen whenever
Investors
Investors save by buying loan-backed assets in competitive markets. Our assumption of competitive markets implies that investors make zero pro…ts, i.e. that equilibrium asset prices fP R g R2fGR;N Rg re ‡ect expected returns, as perceived by investors:
where Pr GjR R2fGR;N Rg denote investors' beliefs regarding asset quality, conditioned on observed ratings.
Model Equilibrium
Thus far, the banks' optimal screening and rating decisions have been described, for given asset prices. We have also discussed how asset prices are related to investors' beliefs regarding asset quality. To close our equilibrium de…nition, we also require that investors' beliefs are consistent with equilibrium outcomes.
Definition. An equilibrium is given by the set of screening banks S , rating strategies f G and f B , the measure of good projects in the economy , investors' beliefs regarding asset quality n Pr GjR o R2fGR;N Rg and asset prices fP R g R2fGR;N Rg such that:
1. Given the asset prices, banks in set S …nd it optimal to screen their projects, while the rest of the banks pick projects at random: condition (5) holds only for banks in S .
2. Given the asset prices, banks that issued type assets …nd it optimal to rate them according to f : conditions (1), (2) hold.
3. Given investors' beliefs, asset prices re ‡ect expected returns: condition (6) holds.
4.
Investors' beliefs are consistent with the equilibrium outcomes:
5. The measure of resource allocation in the economy 2 (0; 1) is determined according to
In belief consistency condition (7), investors' belief Pr GjGR corresponds to the actual fraction of high quality assets, r, among all highly rated assets, i.e. the sum of accurately rated high quality assets, r, and poor quality assets that received a high rating in error, (1 )f B (1 r). Similarly, Pr GjN R de…ned in (8) corresponds to the actual fraction of high quality assets among all unrated assets. We will refer to the belief di¤erential Pr:=Pr GjGR Pr GjN R as rating informativeness, precisely because it captures the increment in the equilibrium probability that the asset is of high quality implied by an observation of a high rating.
To the extent that loan payo¤s W are related to project productivity, the equilibrium object re ‡ects average productivity in the sector that relies on bank …nancing.
Equilibrium Characterization
The optimal screening condition (5) allows us to characterize the set of screening banks in terms of the marginal screener
so that S = k : k k ; where R := R G R B : Banks with screening costs below k choose to screen, while the less productive banks draw projects at random. It follows that the measure of high quality projects in the economy, de…ned in (9) ; can also be written in terms of k :
We proceed to solve for the equilibrium quantities and prices as follows. We …rst characterize the optimal rating strategy f B ( ), which ensures that Conditions 2-4 in the de…nition above hold (Lemma 1). Beliefs and prices are then obtained as functions of . Given these prices, k ( ) is obtained from (10), which allows for the equilibrium resource allocation to be found as a …xed point of (11).
Rating Strategy
The optimal rating strategy f B , described in (1), depends on asset prices. In turn, asset prices depend on investors' beliefs through the zero pro…t condition (6), and beliefs depend on and f B through the consistency conditions in (7) and (8) : Therefore, by substituting consistent beliefs into prices and prices into ratings optimality, we can determine the equilibrium dependence of the rating strategy f B on .
It is …rst helpful to describe how rating accuracy and the cost of screening relative to repayment di¤erential,c := c W ; a¤ect the rating decision. The lemma below characterizes the optimal rating strategy in the parameter space of r andc (for a …xed ).
Lemma 1 Rating Strategies for a Fixed Measure of Resource Allocation
For a …xed 2 [0; ]; where := r c r(1 c) ; rating strategies are given by f G = 1 and
where
( ) is the solution to the rating indi¤erence condition (1) :
The proof is given in the online appendix B. Figure 1 illustrates f B ( ) in the space of r and c for three levels of : Higher levels ofc clearly weaken the incentive to rate poor quality assets.
However, the e¤ect of r is non-monotone. On one hand, raising r increases rating accuracy, making it less likely that a poor quality asset sells at a premium, which discourages rating. On the other hand, raising r increases rating informativeness and the price premium, which tends to encourage rating activity. The latter e¤ect dominates for low r because high ratings are largely uninformative and the premium is low. Conversely, the former e¤ect dominates for large values of r where errors are unlikely.
The return to rating activity is disciplined by the premium P ( ), which, in turn, depends on rating informativeness Pr( ) through
derived from (6). Pr( ) is a hump-shaped. When is small, there are very few good assets in the economy, so a good rating does little to change investors' beliefs regarding asset quality. The same is true for high levels of when all traded assets are predominantly of high quality. For intermediate values of though, a good rating carries a lot of informational content -investors are willing to pay the highest premium on good ratings and banks are most likely to rate.
Screening Strategies and Resource Allocation
Given the equilibrium relationship f B ( ) characterized in Lemma 1, it is straightforward to obtain the equilibrium dependence of investors' beliefs and prices on ; using (6) (8) : Given these prices, the marginal screener k ( ) is determined according to (10) after substituting for the return di¤erential:
An important insight emerges. It is the price di¤erential on assets with good ratings and assets with no ratings that disciplines the banks' screening e¤ort at the stage of loan origination. In turn, as seen from (12), this premium is proportional to rating informativeness Pr( ). It can be shown that Pr( ) is high when r is high and when f B ( ) is low. In that case, a good rating implies a large gain in the perceived quality of the asset, investors pay a large premium on assets with high ratings, and more banks screen their projects.
The fact that f B ( ) < f G ( ) in the range of admissible is important for keeping rating informativeness high. In other words, asset issuers know the quality of their asset and this information is re ‡ected in their rating behavior. Less frequent rating of low quality assets strengthens informativeness of good ratings and raises the premium paid on highly rated assets. This, in turn, encourages the screening e¤ort.
Substituting the resulting marginal screener expression k ( ) into the …nal equilibrium condition (11), we obtain the resource allocation in the economy as a …xed point of
To prove existence and uniqueness of equilibrium, it su¢ces to show that there is a unique solution to the above equation. The proof of equilibrium existence and uniqueness is formalized in the online appendix C. The remaining equilibrium quantities and prices have already been characterized as functions of :
Ine¢ciency of Equilibrium Outcomes
It is instructive to compare outcomes in the decentralized economy to the e¢cient ones. To de…ne social welfare, suppose there is a representative agent that owns banks and rating agencies.
Investors' payo¤s are zero. We assume that the rating cost is a transfer from banks to rating agencies, standing in for extracted monopolistic rents. It follows that the total surplus of the economy is a function of the level of screening activity k:
The …rst two terms give the total project payo¤; the last two terms represent inputs involved in screening and …nancing of projects. As k goes up, more resources are used up in screening, but the total payo¤ increases.
The e¢cient allocation is given by screening activity k that maximizes Y . The social marginal gain of screening by any bank is (1 0 ) W , because good projects are …nanced with probability 0 even in the absence of screening. The marginal cost for a given bank is k: Therefore, it is socially optimal for a bank with the screening cost k to screen whenever (1 0 ) W k: The least productive bank faces the screening cost of 1: If (1 0 ) W > 1, then even the least productive bank should screen. Otherwise, there exists a cuto¤ marginal screener k ef 2 (0; 1) : Formally, the socially e¢cient marginal screener is given by
and the implied socially e¢cient measure of resource allocation is given by
We …nd that, as long as r < 1, the level of screening in the decentralized economy falls short of the socially e¢cient level. In other words, as long as there is room for mistakes, the return di¤eren-tial R which incentivizes individual banks to screen falls short of the social value di¤erential W .
Intuitively, rating informativeness Pr ; and therefore the price di¤erential P; are ine¢ciently low because some good assets are rated low by mistake and because issuers of low quality assets are encouraged to try their luck at getting a high rating. The following proposition formalizes this intuition.
Proposition 1 Decentralized Outcomes vs. Constrained E¢cient Outcomes
Whenever r < 1, the equilibrium level of screening is less than e¢cient, and resources are misallocated:
Proof. First consider the case where (1 0 ) W 1 and so k ef = 1: We want to show that k < k ef = 1: Suppose not. If k = 1 then = 1, and it follows that investors pay P GR ( ) = P N R ( ) = W G : These prices, in turn, imply that no bank will choose to engage in costly screening,
i.e. k = 0. This leads to a contradiction. Now consider the case where (1 0 ) W < 1 and so k ef = (1 0 ) W < 1: Drawing on equilibrium conditions (10) and (13), we have
where the …rst inequality is due to (1 f B )c > 0 and r (1 r)f B < 1, and the second inequality is due to r, Pr < 1. Recognizing that F k + 1 F k 0 increases in k, the result that < ef follows immediately from (14) and (17).
An important message that emerges from this discussion is that the strategic rating component is partly to blame for the ine¢ciency. In fact, it is possible to show that any small exogenous change that e¤ectively discourages ratings of bad assets, whether it is through a direct regulation or change in parameters that directly enter the rating decision (an increase in c or r ; or a decrease in W ), always moves the economy closer to e¢ciency. Since we think of c as a monopolistic rent, a reduction in f B would also redistribute resources from rating agencies to banks.
Proposition 2 Rating Activity and E¢ciency at the Margin
Suppose f B 2 (0; 1). The economy is weakly better o¤ whenever f B is reduced at the margin (while f G = 1 is maintained) as a result of the following small changes: (1) a direct mandate, (2) an increase in c or r, or a decrease in W: 10
One immediate implication is that a regulation that mandates rating of all assets would likely be counterproductive. To the extent that policy can in ‡uence model parameters, this result also suggests direction for optimal policy design. A tax on ratings, for example, would discourage rating activity by raising the e¤ective cost of ratings. A regulation of liability limits, i.e. the amount W B that lenders recover from bad projects, could discourage rating activity by lowering the premium paid on highly rated assets. Importantly, this result does not imply that all successful policies must necessarily reduce rating activity f B :
Macroeconomic E¤ects of a Declining Rating Accuracy
We saw that rating inaccuracy, r < 1; is behind equilibrium ine¢ciency. In Lemma 2, we establish that a decline in r necessarily sends the economy farther away from e¢ciency. 11 This result immediately implies that policy design aimed at raising r; which could be accomplished by reducing asset complexity or regulating rating agencies, would help improve economic outcomes.
Lemma 2 Macroeconomic E¤ects of Rating Accuracy r
Screening e¤ort k and measure of resource allocation are strictly increasing in r:
A change in r -through its e¤ect on strategic ratings -can also generate an unexpected response of asset prices. In fact, if we associate the expansionary period that preceded the 2008 …nancial crisis with growing asset complexity and therefore declining rating accuracy (r #), then our model can help interpret a number of puzzling phenomena.
Figure 2 helps illustrate one informative comparative statics exercise. A decline in r is captured by movement along the x-axis towards the origin. All high quality assets are rated with certainty.
We observe that the strategic rating on the part of lemon holders intensi…es (panel b). For a su¢ciently high rating accuracy, poor quality assets are never rated, and for a low enough level of rating precision, everyone engages in rating. Rating informativeness (panel f) decreases through the direct e¤ect of ratings becoming more prone to error. Importantly, it falls faster in the region 1 0 The proof is in the online appendix D. 1 1 The proof is in the online appendix E.
where the mixed strategy is played. In this region, investors' beliefs regarding the relative quality of highly rated assets deteriorate due to both-the direct e¤ect of less accurate ratings and the indirect e¤ect of intensi…ed rating activity. In the same region, the fraction of banks screening and the measure of high quality projects in the economy decline most rapidly (panels a and c). This is not surprising, because the screening decision depends on the premium paid on highly rated assets and on the probability of obtaining a good rating, both of which decline.
Most interestingly, the prevalence of highly rated traded assets rises despite declining average quality of extended loans (panels a and e). This happens in the (empirically relevant) region of mixed strategy. The reason for this regularity is the intensi…ed rating of poor quality assets. Therefore, our model is consistent with the following phenomena observed during the expansionary period leading up to the crisis: Laxer screening standards and rising delinquency rates (panels a and c); An intensi…ed use of ratings (panel b); Rising default probability conditional on a high rating, i.e. rating in ‡ation (panel d); (4) A decline in yield spreads between low rated and highly rated securities, or equivalently, a drop in the premium paid on highly rated assets (panel f); (5) An increased prevalence of highly rated assets despite the worsening pool of loans that back them (panels a and e).
Laxer screening standards are identi…ed by the empirical papers cited in the Introduction. The upsurge in loan delinquency rates can be seen in aggregate data. 12 (Benmelech & Dlugosz, 2009b) and (Gri¢n & Tang, 2011) provide empirical evidence for the intensi…ed rating activity and ratings in ‡ation prior to the crisis. The decline in yield spreads is simply an upshot of ratings in ‡ation.
Finally, the rise in prevalence of triple-A rated assets to only result in massive downgrades is discussed in (Cornaggia et al. , 2017) and (Benmelech & Dlugosz, 2009b) .
Moreover, our model is consistent with the following empirical regularity documented in (Cornaggia et al. , 2017): After conditioning on ratings, the more opaque asset classes (i.e. lower r) exhibit greater default rates. Our model would imply these assets are of lower average quality, and therefore would exhibit greater default rates, conditional on a given rating.
Policy Experiments
We analyze several regulatory policies that aim to increase information production in …nancial markets so as to improve economic outcomes. Contrary to conventional wisdom, these policies are shown to worsen the degree of resource misallocation.
Mandatory Rating
Consider a policy that dictates that all assets are rated. In this economy, a lack of a rating will signal a hidden poor rating, which implies all ratings will be disclosed, and prices will be conditioned on good and bad ratings. Therefore, an introduction of mandatory ratings is equivalent to setting
By intensifying rating activity on the part of sellers of low quality assets, this policy introduces more confusion in the asset market. As the high rating premium declines -a result of policy intervention -banks curtail screening expenditures.
Denoting the measure of good assets in the economy under mandatory rating by mr , we formalize our main …ndings in the proposition below.
Proposition 3 Macroeconomic Implications of Mandatory Rating Policy
Rating intensi…es, f ;mr B = 1 f B ; and resource misallocation worsens, mr .
Proof. It su¢ces to show that the right hand side of (14) is lower in the case of mandatory ratings, which would imply a lower …xed point. Recognizing that the right hand side increases in k ( ) and therefore in R, it su¢ces to show that R mr ( ) R ( ) for admissible : This result follows immediately from the de…nition of R after substituting for prices and employing the expression of f B ( ) given in Lemma 1. The inequality is strict in the range of where f B ( ) 2 (0; 1) in the benchmark model.
This policy experiment highlights the importance of distinct ratings of high quality and low quality assets, f B < f G ; in the benchmark model. The fact that poor quality asset issuers know they have a lemon and act on that information translates into less frequent rating use on their part. This margin makes good ratings more informative and helps discipline screening activity.
Mandatory ratings policy is counterproductive because it interferes with this margin.
Certi…ed Review and Mandatory Ratings Disclosure
Consider a policy that eliminates availability of free bad ratings. We refer to this policy as certi…ed review, as it may be implemented by a mandate that all ratings are obtained through one of a few certi…ed agencies. In practice, these agencies would charge a hefty monopolistic rent for their review regardless of its nature or outcome. In particular, an issuer would not be able to obtain a bad rating for free, even if the cost incurred by the agency were negligible such as in the case of failure to provide information needed for review.
The certi…ed review policy is designed to eliminate confusion between unrated and poorly rated assets. It eliminates the possibility of passing unrated assets o¤ as hidden poorly rated assets. As a result, investors can potentially di¤erentiate between assets with good ratings, assets with bad ratings, and unrated assets. In this richer context, we also consider the policy of mandatory ratings disclosure which requires that all ratings are disclosed but leaves the rating decision up to the issuer. Both policies are designed to produce more information in asset markets. Yet, both imply more intensi…ed rating activity and inferior equilibrium outcomes.
Certi…ed Review
The equilibrium de…nition needs to be adjusted to accommodate the possibility of three distinct signals in this economy: R 2 fGR; BR; N Rg. The equilibrium is now given by the set of screening banks S , rating strategies f G ; f B , measure of good projects in the economy , investors' beliefs Pr GjR R and asset prices fP R g R that satisfy the previously stated conditions, subject to the following adjustments.
High quality assets are now rated with certainty (f G = 1) if and only if
Low quality assets are rated with certainty (f B = 1) if the indi¤erence condition (18) holds with ">", rated with probability f B 2 (0; 1) if the indi¤erence condition applies, and never rated (f B = 0) otherwise:
(1 r) P GR + rP BR c S P N R :
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Expected returns to an asset of type 2 fB; Gg are now given by
Investors' beliefs are restated as:
Pr GjN R = 0:
The last result holds because high quality assets are always rated and disclosed.
Because the introduction of this policy eliminates any confusion of poorly rated assets with unrated assets, bad ratings now serve as positive signals. It becomes optimal to disclose them. This is formalized in the lemma below.
Lemma 3 Ratings Disclosure under Certi…ed Review
All ratings, good or bad, are disclosed.
Proof. Because f G = 1, it is clear that Pr GjN R = 0, and therefore P N R = W B . Is is also known that Pr GjBR > 0 due to r < 1. Therefore, P BR > W B ; and the result follows.
This policy encourages rating of low quality assets. In fact, it is seen immediately that, for all admissible ; rating strategy f mix B ( ) ; obtained by solving the indi¤erence condition (18) ; is strictly greater than its benchmark counterpart (de…ned in Lemma 1). 13 In fact, it is clear that f B > 0; i.e. it cannot be the case that low quality assets are never rated. The intuition is as follows. If low quality assets were never rated in the economy where good assets are always rated, then the disclosure of any rating, even a bad one, signals a high quality asset with certainty. The equilibrium asset prices generated by such beliefs would incentivize rating of poor quality assets, which implies a contradiction.
As a result of increased rating activity, this policy reduces the informational value of good ratings and the premium paid on highly rated assets. Banks reduce their screening e¤ort and credit misallocation worsens, just as in the case of mandatory ratings. The result is formalized below, where we also compare outcomes implied by mandatory ratings and certi…ed review policies. The proof is provided in the online appendix G.
Proposition 4 Macroeconomic Implications of Certi…ed Review
If 2 0;
1 r c 1 r rc , then f B;cr f B and cr :
The condition on the admissible range of applies in the empirically relevant case where f B 2 (0; 1); and it is more stringent than needed for the result. The last condition is quite weak, and therefore we expect mandatory ratings to be more detrimental than certi…ed review. After all, all assets are rated under mandatory ratings, while f cr B < 1 ensues for a wide range of parameter values under certi…ed review. Yet, if c is high relative to W B , mandatory rating may fare better than certi…ed review despite it inducing more ratings. The intuition comes from the fact that bad loans impose greater rating expenditures, which makes screening more attractive.
Mandatory Ratings Disclosure
In the context of a model with certi…ed review, consider a policy that also mandates for all ratings to be disclosed. We …nd this policy makes no di¤erence relative to certi…ed review, as all ratings are already optimally disclosed.
Proposition 5 Macroeconomic Implications of Mandatory Ratings Disclosure
1 r c 1 r rc , then f B;md = f B;cr f B and md = cr :
Proof. Follows immediately from Lemma 3.
Optimal Policy Analysis
We consider a policy maker that cannot directly enforce screening by banks, dictate the use of ratings, or observe the quality of extended loans, but can distort prices via tax policy. The policy maker entertains two policies. The …rst is a tax on rating activity which distorts rating prices. The second is a tax/subsidy scheme which distorts prices of rated and unrated assets.
Both policies improve economic outcomes. However, full e¢ciency is attainable only in the case of the tax/subsidy scheme. In contrast to the tax on rating activity, which distorts rating costs for all banks, regardless of whether or not they screen, the tax/subsidy scheme directly rewards the screeners and punishes the non-screeners. It is therefore more e¤ective.
Tax on Rating Activity
In light of Proposition 2, it seems reasonable that a tax on rating activity may help reduce strategic rating activity and move the economy closer to e¢ciency. We consider a policy that levies a tax c on the use of a rating technology and redistributes the proceeds equally among all banks.
We …nd that a tax on rating activity is indeed successful in the empirically relevant space of parameter values -those that imply a mixed strategy in the benchmark model. Mechanically speaking, for the indi¤erence condition (1) to continue to hold in response to an increase in the e¤ective cost of ratings c c, the price di¤erential P must increase. This is obtained through a lower rating activity f B . Thus, as c increases rating costs and rating activity is reduced (f B #).
High ratings become more meaningful, and investors are willing to pay more for them, which incentivizes more banks to engage in screening. For a large enough max c ; strategic rating activity is fully eliminated (f B = 0), and further increases in the tax are counterproductive. This is because the only remaining marginal e¤ect is on the sellers of high quality assets, which makes the ex-ante screening option less attractive. The result is formalized below. The proof, given in the online appendix H, closely follows our discussion.
Proposition 6 Macroeconomic E¤ects of the Ratings' Tax, c
If f B ( ) = 1; then k and are independent of c .
If f B ( ) 2 (0; 1) (the empirically relevant case), then f B is decreasing while k and are strictly increasing in c .
If f B ( ) = 0; then k and are strictly decreasing in c :
As long as f B > 0; which is the case for all c < max c ; it is optimal to rate high quality assets with certainty and therefore no additional parametric assumptions are needed to ensure f G = 1:
Thus, an increase in c can successfully eliminate strategic ratings. The question is whether or not full e¢ciency can be reached before the tax becomes counterproductive. The following result shows that is not the case.
Proposition 7 A tax on ratings cannot achieve full e¢ciency. 
Proof. It follows from

Tax/subsidy policy
Now consider a policy intervention that combines a tax on transactions of loans with no ratings ( N R ) and a subsidy on transactions of highly rated loans ( GR ). We require that GR > 0 and N R 2 (0; 1) and impose a budget constraint for the policy maker.
Proposition 8 There exists a tax-subsidy scheme f GR > 0; N R 2 (0; 1)g that induces the e¢-cient level of resource allocation, provided the following parametric condition is satis…ed:
where fP r R g R2fGR;N Rg are evaluated at ef .
The above result shows this simple scheme attains e¢ciency if W is not too high. However, if W is very high, the stakes are high and e¢ciency dictates that nearly all banks screen, which would require una¤ordable subsidies. The optimal tax/subsidy rates are derived in the proof (see the online appendix I).
It is important to emphasize that if e¢ciency cannot be achieved with the tax/subsidy scheme, it is because it is impossible to do so even through the general mechanism design approach that conditions banks' payo¤s on their declared screening costs. In the online appendix J, we formally
show that all outcomes attainable by the general mechanism can also be achieved by a pooling mechanism that speci…es only two payo¤s, one for having …nanced each type of loan. Moreover, it can be done without changing the implementation cost for the policy maker. It is precisely this pooling mechanism that our policy maker implements by distorting prices in asset markets.
Conclusion
We developed a general equilibrium model that allowed us to study the interaction of information transmission in secondary markets for loans, via ratings and their disclosure, and screening intensity at the stage of loan origination. The model provides insight into what determines screening e¤ort at the stage of loan origination and explains why it is less than optimal. Because rating technology is imperfect, strategic rating activity ensues in equilibrium, reducing the premium paid on highly rated assets and weakening the incentive to screen. Nonetheless, the fact that banks know their asset quality helps curtail strategic ratings and keep the premium high. Several conventional regulatory policies interfere with this margin and move the economy farther from e¢ciency. Our optimal policy analysis considers a policy maker that cannot directly enforce screening by banks or dictate the use of ratings. We show this policy maker can restore e¢ciency by introducing a tax/subsidy scheme in asset markets. A tax on rating activity can also improve outcomes but cannot restore full e¢ciency. Proposition. Assumption 1 guarantees that all banks participate in lending.
Proof
All banks have the option of not screening. Therefore, the ex-ante pro…ts are at least 0 R G + (1 0 )R B . Moreover, denoting by R i the pro…ts net of investment and rating costs, we conclude that ex-ante pro…ts for all banks are at least 0 R G + (1 0 ) R B 1 c; which assumes maximum rating costs.
Investors make zero pro…ts when they buy loans from the average distribution in the economy, i.e. R G + (1 ) R B = W G + (1 )W B . Because non-screeners have a project that is worse than average ( 0 < ), investors lose money when trading with them:
Therefore, all banks expect to earn at least 0 W G + (1 0 )W B c 1; which is positive by Assumption 1.
B Proof of Lemma 1
Rating strategy f B . Case 1. f B = 1: From (1), this strategy is optimal whenever (1 r) P > c: Substituting for prices from the zero pro…t condition (6), we have
Substituting for beliefs from the consistency condition (6) and from f B = 1 gives the necessary and su¢cient condition for the above inequality:
(1 r) W r r + (1 )(1 r)
(1 r) (1 r) + r(1 ) > c; or
(1 r) (1 )(2r 1) (r (2r 1))( (2r 1) + (1 r)) > c W :
Case 2. f B = 0: Following the same steps as in Case 1, we …nd this strategy is optimal whenever (1 r) W Pr < c:
Substituting for beliefs from the consistency conditions and for f B = 0, we obtain
Case 3. f B 2 (0; 1): The mixed strategy is optimal whenever
(1 r) W Pr = c:
Substituting into the above equality for Pr from (7) and (8) gives
It is straightforward to show that the positive solution to this equation is given by
3)
The optimal strategy f B is given by f mix B derived above, but bounded by 0 from below and 1 from above. Thus we have f B 2 (0; 1) whenever
(1 )(2r 1) (r (2r 1))( (2r 1) + (1 r)) < c W < (1 r) 1 1 r :
The …rst inequality appearing in the expression above is derived by setting f mix B < 1, and the second inequality is derived by setting f mix B > 0:
Rating strategy f G . To ensure that f G = 1, we must impose that r W Pr > c:
This inequality holds whenever f B > 0 as in that case r W Pr > (1 r) W Pr c:
However, an additional restriction is needed in the space of parameters that imply f B = 0. Substituting for Pr in the case of f B = 0 and simplifying, we obtain r W Pr = r W 1 1 r > c:
The result follows.
C Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium
Proposition. Denote the right hand side of the equilibrium condition (11) by H :
If parameter values satisfyc (1 r) (2r 1), then also assume
where f := sup
Then H 0 ( ) 1 and there exists a unique equilibrium.
Proof
Note that the condition (C:2) imposed to ensure uniqueness is quite weak. In fact, this condition is not needed for parameterizations that imply that the equilibrium measure of high quality assets is over a half. 14 Because H( ) is continuous, there exists at least one …xed point of H( ) whenever H(0) > 0 and H ( ) < . The …xed point is unique if H 0 ( ) < 1 on the entire range of 2 (0; ). De…ne constants 1 , 2 , 3 as follows: 1 and 2 denote the lower and higher solutions of f mix B = 1 and 3 solves f mix B = 0.
Step 1. Existence Recall the de…nition of H : [0; ] ! [ 0 ; 1] given in (C:1) :
Substituting for R ( ) into (10) ; we obtain the marginal screener k ( ) :
where the rating informativeness
was derived from (7) and (8) :
We use the resulting expression to …nd H (0). We know from Lemma 1 that f B (0) = 0 and f G (0) = 1: Hence, Pr (0) = 1 and
Our next objective is to …nd H ( ) : By Lemma 1, f B ( ) = 0 and f G ( ) = 1. Hence, Pr ( ) = 1 1 r and
Hence,
The assumption 0 < then implies that H ( ) < : We showed that H (0) > 0 and H ( ) < ; which implies that equation = H ( ) has at least one solution.
Step 2. Uniqueness Now we move on to discuss uniqueness. Di¤erentiating H ( ), we obtain
Range 1. First, consider the highest admissible range of 2 ( 3 ; ), where f B = 0 by Lemma 1. Substituting for f B into (C:3) and di¤erentiating, we obtain
and therefore
Range 2. If parameters satisfyc (1 r) (2r 1), consider 2 (0; 1 ) and 2 ( 2 ; 3 ) : If instead parameters satisfyc > (1 r) (2r 1), consider the entire range of 2 (0; 3 ) : By Lemma 1, we have f B 2 (0; 1) for these values of , and therefore Pr = c (1 r) W : Substituting this into (C:3) and di¤erentiating gives us @ k @ = 0 and therefore
Range 3. It remains to consider the range 2 ( 1 ; 2 ) ; relevant only if parameters satisfỹ c (1 r) (2r 1) : By Lemma 1, f B = 1: Substituting that into k and di¤erentiating, we obtain
which then implies
r (1 r) 1 + (1 )
The resulting derivative is a decreasing function of , with a zero at = 0:5: If 0:5, then H 0 ( ) 0. If < 0:5, then H 0 ( ) > 0, and it is maximized out at 1 : Therefore, we can bound H 0 ( ) on the range of 2 ( 1 ; 0:5) by setting H 0 ( 1 ) < 1:
Substituting the expression for 1 into the expression for H 0 ( ) ; given in (C:4) ; and noting that 1 (1 1 ) simpli…es toc r(1 r) (2r 1)(1 r c(2r 1)) , we obtain
(1 r)(2r 1) c (2r 1)(c+1 2cr r) 1 +c r(1 r) (2r 1)(1 r c(2r 1))
where f = sup k2[0;1] F 0 (k), and the last inequality is satis…ed by the premise.
To summarize, we found that H ( ) is weakly decreasing in the entire range of 2 (0; ) if c > (1 r) (2r 1) : It is also weakly decreasing in the range of 2 (0:5; ) ifc (1 r) (2r 1) : In all cases, H 0 ( ) < 1; which ensures that equation = H ( ) has exactly one solution.
It follows that the equilibrium exists, and it is unique.
D Proof of Proposition 2
Consider a regulation that directly lowers f B and does not a¤ect any parameters. To understand marginal changes in k; we di¤erentiate (10) with respect to f B and evaluate it at the original equilibrium:
This inequality follows from the fact that (1 r) W Pr( ) = c in the original equilibrium and @ Pr @f B < 0. It follows that k increases. Because F k + 1 F k 0 increases in k, condition (14) implies the same qualitative response in .
Next consider changing parameters that directly enter the rating decision. Substituting for prices into the indi¤erence condition (1) obtains (1 r) W Pr( ) = c: Note that Pr( ) decreases in f B ( ) : Consider an increase in c or r; or a decrease in W that raise Pr( ) and lower f B ( ) : Note this condition will continue to hold exactly as long as f B remains interior, i.e. for small parameter changes. Substituting it into (10) obtains k = (1 0 )
c(2r 1) 1 r : It follows that k is independent of W but increases with an increase in c or r. Because F k + 1 F k 0 increases in k, condition (14) implies the same qualitative response in .
E Proof of Lemma 2
De…ning H as the right hand side of condition (11), (r) = H( (r); r); we obtain
and we showed that 1 H > 0: Therefore, the sign of 
we see that r enters through two channels. An increase in the rating precision directly increases the payo¤ to screening by increasing the probability that holders of high quality assets will receive a good rating and sell their assets at a premium and by decreasing the probability that holders of poor quality assets will receive a good rating in error and sell at a premium. There is also an indirect e¤ect working through f B which in ‡uences the actual premium paid on a highly rated asset. There are two cases to consider. Case 1. Suppose that f B 2 (0; 1): Then Pr = c W (1 r) : This means that rating informativeness and hence the premium paid on high quality assets also increase in r: Both e¤ects work in the same direction. Formally, we substitute for Pr into (E:1) to obtain k = (1 0 ) 2r 1 1 r c, which is clearly increasing in r: Hence, 
Proof
In light of r > 0:5; the rating decision rules imply that f G f B ; and we consider the space of parameters that imply f G = 1: We …rst rule out the case of f B = 0: Suppose that f B = 0: The beliefs expressions (21) -(23) then imply that Pr GjGR =Pr GjBR = 1 and Pr GjN R = 0: Substituting these into asset prices, we get P GR = P BR = W G and P N R = W B : Substituting for these prices into (18) ; we see that it is optimal to rate poor quality assets as long as W > c; which holds by Assumption 1. This implies a contradiction.
The remaining cases are: (a) f G = f B = 1 and (b) f G = 1 and f B 2 (0; 1): Both cases imply Pr GjN R = 0 and therefore P N R = W B .
Case a For both types of assets to be rated, it must be the case that P GR + (1 r)P BR > W B + c and (1 r) P GR + rP BR > W B + c: The latter condition is su¢cient to ensure that both hold. Substituting for prices and beliefs in that condition and using f B = 1 in the resulting expression, we obtainc
Case b The indi¤erence condition (18) holds. Substituting for prices and beliefs, we obtain
The mixed strategy f mix B is the positive root of the above expression. Setting f mix B > 0 simpli…es toc < 1; while setting f mix
Noting that r(1 r)
[ r+(1 )(1 r)][ (1 r)+(1 )r] equals 0 at = 0 and increases in in the interval 2 (0; 1), this lemma allows us to characterize the shape of f B ( ) under certi…ed review. For low , f B ( ) 2 (0; 1) : As increases, f B switches to 1 and stays there. For all 2 (0; 1]; we have f B > 0; which we know implies f G = 1, and therefore no additional restriction is needed to guarantee that f G = 1: 
G Proof of Proposition 4
Comparison of Certi…ed Review to the Benchmark Model To show that cr , it su¢ces to show that H cr ( )
We will drop the dependence of quantities and prices on for notational clarity. We will employ the following expressions from the benchmark model: R given in (13) and P given in (12). The relevant quantities for the certi…ed review economy are:
It is clear from Lemma 1 and appendix F that f cr B ( ) f B ( ) : Hence, we have to consider three cases.
In the benchmark economy, 4R = c 2r 1 1 r ; obtained by substituting from the indi¤erence condition (1) into R.
In the certi…ed review economy,
obtained by substituting from the indi¤erence condition (18) into R cr . It follows that 4R cr < 4R because (1 r)+(1 )f cr B r > 0:
In the benchmark economy, 4R = (2r 1)
(1 r) (1 r)+(1 )r W; obtained by substituting for prices into 4R and using f B = 1.
In the certi…ed review economy, 4R cr = (2r 1)
(1 r) (1 r)+(1 )r i W; obtained by substituting for the relevant prices into 4R cr and using f cr B = 1. It follows that 4R = 4R cr :
Case 3. f B ( ) is mixed and f cr B ( ) = 1:
We already showed that 4R = c 2r 1 1 r in the benchmark economy (case 1). We also found the relevant 4R cr (case 2), which is a symmetric inverted parabola centered at 0:5.
De…ne constants 1 , 2 , 3 as follows: 1 and 2 denote the lower and higher solutions of 
Comparison of Certi…ed Review to Mandatory Ratings Next, we need to show that mr < cr : It su¢ces to prove that the operator H is higher under certi…cation. This amounts to showing that 4R is higher under certi…cation. Note that under mandatory ratings, 4R = (2r 1)
1, the inequality follows from the assumption W G c (2r 1) W:
H Proof of Proposition 6
Because c multiplies c and the lump-sum transfer has no e¤ect on banking decisions, it su¢ces to perform the comparative statics on c: Consider H de…ned as the right hand side of equilibrium condition (11): (c) = H( (c); c): We obtain
We also showed that 1 H > 0: Therefore, the sign of @ @c is determined by the sign of H c . Recalling the de…nition of H,
we see that H( ; ) is increasing in c if and only if k( ; ) is increasing in c.
Recalling the expression for the marginal screener,
we see that c enters through several channels, directly by raising the cost of high quality baskets and indirectly through f B ( ; c) and Pr ( ; c) : There are three cases to consider. we have k = (1 0 )(2r 1) W Pr : Because Pr depends on c only through f B , which is …xed at 1, we have that k is independent of c:
I Proof of Proposition 8
Step 1. Recall from Section 3.3. that the e¢cient marginal screener is given by k ef = minf(1 0 ) W; 1g. To simplify notation, we will drop stars when talking about equilibrium outcomes. In a decentralized equilibrium, the marginal screener is given by k = minf(1 0 ) R; 1g. Therefore, the policy needs to induce prices that imply R = W:
Step 2. With such prices, all banks will participate. It su¢ces to show that the marginal screener k, whose payo¤ is R G k, chooses to participate. Indeed, all non-screeners face the same payo¤, and the payo¤ is strictly greater for all other screeners because they face a lower k: The marginal screener will choose to participate if payo¤ R G k 0: This is implied by k = (1 0 ) R after substituting for R B 0; which we know holds due to our parametric assumption on the pool of projects (Assumption 1).
Step 3. We now derive the tax/subsidy scheme that implements the desired R. Consider a tax rate N R applied to transactions of unrated loans, and a subsidy rate GR applied to transactions of highly rated loans. Suppose in the economy with no taxes, we have f B = 0: From Lemma 1, we can see that as taxes and subsidies increase, f B increases. Our preference is to suppose the benchmark economy is in the empirical relevant case where f B 2 (0; 1): We show that the policy has no e¤ect on R if a mixed strategy is played. In this region, the indi¤erence condition (1) implies R = c 2r 1 1 r , which is independent of the tax level. In other words, any tax change intended to increase the e¤ective premium (1 + GR )P GR (1 N R )P N R is o¤set by an increase in f B . However, once f B = 1 is reached, further increases in tax and subsidy moves the economy towards e¢ciency. Substituting for f B = 1 we have R = (2r 1)[(1 + GR )P GR (1 N R )]P N R ;
with P GR = r r+(1 )(1 r) W + W B and P N R =
(1 r)
(1 r)+(1 )r W + W B : In order to attain full e¢ciency ( R = W ) and satisfy the policy maker's budget constraint, ( GR ; N R ) must satisfy the following two conditions: minf(1 0 ) W; 1g = (1 0 ) (2r 1)[(1 + GR )P GR (1 N R )P N R ]; (I.1)
GR rP GR N R P N R (1 r): (I.2)
Step 4. For a policy to be feasible, we must have GR ; N R 2 (0; 1). The bound is given by setting N R = 1. Therefore, obtaining GR from equation (I.1) and imposing inequality (I.2) we conclude that an e¢cient allocation can be achieved if the following parametric condition holds: minf W; (1 0 ) 1 gr ef 2r 1 minf W; (1 0 ) 1 g(P r GR P r N R )r ef + P r N R ; (I.3)
where P r GR = ef r ef r+(1 ef )(1 r)
, P r N R = ef (1 r) ef (1 r)+(1 ef )r and ef = F (k ef ) + (1 F (k ef )) 0 : For the inequality to be satis…ed, W cannot be too high. When is W is high, we go to the case where = 1 and minf W; (1 0 ) 1 g = (1 0 ) 1 . The inequality becomes r 2r 1 1 0 , which is never satis…ed.
Step 5. Note that f G is non-decreasing in 0 s and, therefore, no additional conditions are needed to ensure f G = 1 under this policy scheme.
J A Note on Optimal Policy: the Mechanism Design Approach
This note formalizes the claim made in Section 5.2.. We show that all outcomes attainable by a general mechanism which conditions payo¤s on declared k 0 s can also be achieved by a pooling mechanism which o¤ers only two contracts: one for the screeners and one for the non-screeners. The latter can be implemented with the tax/subsidy policy studied in Proposition 8.
De…nition 1 A mechanism is given by fP GR (k) ; P N R (k)g : [0; 1] =) R 2 , indicating banks' payo¤s to trading a highly rated and an unrated asset, conditional on declaring a screening cost k.
This mechanism can be equivalently speci…ed in terms of fR G (k); R B (k)g : [0; 1] ! R 2 indicating payo¤s associated with having made good/bad loans. The equivalence is given by R G (k) = rP GR (k) + (1 r)P N R (k) c 1 and R B (k) = (1 r)P GR (k) + rP N R (k) f B c 1. We want to show that it is without loss of generality that we can restrict attention to a pooling mechanism, where all banks are o¤ered the same menu (R G ; R B ): Proposition Any outcome attained by the general mechanism can be also attained by a pooling mechanism that o¤ers the same menu (R G ; R B ) to all banks, without changing the implementation cost to the policy maker.
Proof
Step 1. First, we show we can restrict attention to a simpler mechanism with a menu of two options, one designed as a recommendation to screen, and another as a recommendation not to screen: (R S G ; R S B ); (R N S G ; R N S B ). By additive separability of screening costs, any mechanism fR G (k); R B (k)g that induces a bank of type k to screen also induces a bank of type k 0 < k to screen. Analogously, if a bank of type k does not screen, any bank of type k 0 > k will not screen. Moreover, incentive compatibility implies that all screening (non-screening) banks will select the same contract regardless of k:
Step 2. Next, we want to show we can further restrict attention to a pooling mechanism (R G ; R B ): Consider the mechanism (R S G ; R S B ); (R N S G ; R N S B ). There is ak such that
Banks choose the recommendation to screen i¤ k k : It is clear that any pooling mechanism (R G ;R B ) such that
induces the same behavior.
Step 3. Moreover, the pooling mechanism can be chosen in a way that implies the same implementation cost for the planner. The mechanism (R S G ; R S B ); (R N S G ; R N S B ) costs
(1 F (k))k;
Imperfect Information Transmission from Banks to Investors: Macroeconomic Implications 12 while the pooling mechanism costsR G (1 F (k))k. In order to keep the implementation cost the same, we choose (R G ; R B ) that satisfy R G = R S G , and (1 0 )(R S G R B ) =k:
